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In the early 1990s Sid Weighell, retired General Secretary of the National Union of 
Railwaymen, was interviewed by Anthony Howard for a BBC Radio 4 series on the post-
1945 history of trade unions. Describing the apparent transformation of social and 
industrial relations overseen by the 1945 Labour government, Weighell recalled the 
words of a train driver, spoken to him as a young railway fireman, following the 
nationalization of the railways. ‘Go careful with that shovel’, the driver said. ‘It’s ours 
now.’1 This allusion to the sense of ownership and purpose instilled in the workforce by 
nationalization, which encompassed a variety of industries and services, is consistent 
with Ross McKibbin’s elegant analysis of the redistribution of ‘social esteem’ that took 
place in Britain in the 1940s. Class relations were, he argues, reconfigured so that the 
manual working class enjoyed enhanced social and political status as well as improved 
material well-being; this involved a sinking of inter-war class conflicts, including an 
erosion of the anti-working class prejudices and anxieties that characterized the inter-
war middle class or classes.2
McKibbin’s analysis can be related to long-running ideas about war and social 
change, and more recent debates about the post-war ‘consensus’. Arthur Marwick, 
principal architect of the ‘war and social change’ thesis, in the 1960s and 1970s argued 
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that in Britain both world wars benefited under-privileged groups which occupied a 
valuable or enhanced economic, political and social role; these groups were rewarded 
through top-down social policy or secured positive change through bottom-up pressure.3 
The war and social change model, which emphasised social and political convergence, 
duly influenced the debate about ‘consensus’, which stressed broad areas of economic, 
social and foreign policy agreement between the Labour and Conservative parties from 
the 1940s to the 1960s.4 These two meta discourses – war and social change, and 
consensus – contributed to the broad agreement which existed until fairly recently 
among non-Marxist labour and industrial relations historians about the essential 
discontinuities of the 1940s. Influential here were Alan Bullock’s first two biographical 
monuments to Ernest Bevin, the labour movement’s dominant twentieth century figure, 
published in 1960 and 1967. These books charted the unions’ inter-war difficulties and 
then the extent to which their position was positively transformed by Bevin’s wartime 
policies at the Ministry of Labour.5 Peter Weiler’s more critical appraisal of Bevin, 
published in 1993, noted the relatively unreconstructed nature of capitalist social 
relations in the 1940s, but emphasized the opportunities that were taken – by Bevin and 
others – to rebalance industrial and social relations in the interests of labour and the 
working class.6 The primacy of ‘1945’ – as the labour movement’s crowning achievement 
– was consolidated in the 1980s and early 1990s through the impressive biographies of 
the Attlee governments written by Kenneth Morgan and Peter Hennessy.7
Readers of Twentieth Century British History will, however, be familiar with the 
literature emerging since the early 1990s that questions the extent and meaning of the 
political, economic and social changes that took place in the 1940s.8 This article 
contributes to the growing sense that the historical discontinuities of the 1940s and 
1950s have been exaggerated. It does so by emphasizing the powerful legacy of the 
inter-war period, with industrial and social relations after 1945 clearly shaped by 
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arrangements, practices and prejudices inherited from the 1920s and 1930s. The main 
thesis is that the limited changes that emerged in the 1940s and 1950s were guided by 
developments in these earlier decades, and that the extent of the believed rebalancing 
of power between labour and capital – in labour’s favour – ought to be reconsidered. 
Class antagonism remained a powerful feature of British society and was in important 
respects sharpened by labour’s temporarily enhanced market position in the context of 
‘full employment’. This is broadly consistent with Peregrine Worsthorne’s 
characterization in 1959 of the post-war ‘settlement’. Far from being a ‘consensus’, 
informed by the growth of social convergence, harmony or partnership, this was in reality 
a ‘stalemate’ between two more or less diametrically opposed social forces of roughly 
equivalent political strength, locked in a grudging truce.9
 McKibbin himself has written that in the 1940s inter-war stereotypes of the 
working class ’remained as powerful as ever; they were just believed by fewer people’.10 
So social relations were, perhaps, subject more to quantitative than qualitative change. 
Such might be the interpretation of Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska’s examination of the 
resistance of the population, including the middle class population, to the governing 
emphasis in the 1940s and 1950s on the more equitable distribution of economic and 
social resources.11 Discussion of limited discontinuities in the mid-century is also found 
in recent scholarship on trade unions and industrial relations. Important works here 
include Chris Wrigley’s survey of trade unions in Britain since 1933, which examines the 
growth and improving fortunes of organized labour in the years preceding 1940, and 
Alan Campbell and John McIlroy’s discussion of Scottish mineworkers, which interprets 
wartime militancy as extending a trend rising from the early 1930s. In similar vein Nina 
Fishman’s discussion of Order 1305, governing compulsory state arbitration of industrial 
disputes, introduced by Bevin in 1940 but abolished in 1951, highlights the temporary 
nature of change, with the pre-1940 emphasis on voluntarist industrial relations – 
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conducted chiefly with reference to short-term labour market conditions – reasserted by 
the early 1950s.12
 This article develops the thesis of limited change in social and industrial relations 
in the ‘narrow’ mid-century with a case study of port transport, a critical sector of Britain’s 
island and trading economy. ‘The most vital part of a country like ours is its coastline’, 
said Bevin in 1922, addressing the first meeting of the National Docks Trade Group of 
the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU), ‘and the workers in the dock areas, 
which were the mouths of the nation, held a correspondingly important place’.13 The 
ports are also worth examining because they ostensibly represent a strong case for the 
argument that social and industrial relations were transformed in the 1940s. High levels 
of employment and the institution of the National Dock Labour Scheme were concrete 
evidence to many in the 1940s that the workforce had secured major improvements. Yet 
these were limited adjustments, and in any case shaped by perspectives and policies 
formed in the 1910s and 1920s. It will be argued that the very strong continuities in 
industrial and social relations from the inter-war period were present in the wider 
economy and not just in the ports after 1945.  
 In class terms, of course, dock workers might be regarded as a distinctive group, 
characterized by peculiarities upon which broader conclusions about the position of 
manual workers cannot be drawn. Patrick Joyce and David Cannadine, among many 
others, have pointed to the structural fracturing of the manual working class across the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which weakens ‘class’ as a useful tool of social 
analysis. Both concede, however, that class identity carried great force in strongly 
manual, labour intensive and industrial sectors,14 and dock workers, along with 
construction workers, coal miners and others, fit this typology neatly enough. Yet even 
this broader band of ‘traditional’ manual workers, chiefly associated with productive 
industries, was perhaps not so different from the swathe of ‘modern’ manual workers in 
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consumption industries. The authors of the multi-volume Affluent Worker sociological 
study of the 1960s argued that manual workers in car, ball bearing and chemical 
production were characterized by orientations to class, work and trade unionism that 
varied from those of ‘traditional’ workers. But these ‘affluent’ workers shared the 
attachment of other manual workers to collective action precisely because of their 
‘position and role as men who sell their labour power to an employer in return for 
wages’.15 Meanwhile the ability of most manual workers – ‘affluent’ or otherwise – to 
consume was very largely contingent on structures of industrial bargaining, shaped by 
market forces, with a footing in the 1920s and 1930s. Manual workers in many 
occupations and sectors sought to turn these structures to their advantage in the 
tightened labour market conditions operating from the 1940s to the 1960s. This 
occasionally involved industrial action that was sometimes successful in securing 
improved working class living standards. The broad reach of class antagonism across 
industry can duly be seen in the criticism that such industrial action drew from politicians, 
business leaders and newspaper editors in the 1960s and 1970s, whether the action 
was waged by ‘affluent’ or ‘traditional’ manual workers. 
The chronological focus of the article is from the 1920s to the 1960s. This is to 
emphasize the core of the thesis: that in port transport the major points of discontinuity in 
the longer mid-century were in the 1920s and 1970s and not in the 1940s; and that the 
limited changes that took shape in the 1940s were essentially framed by practices and 
prejudices established in the 1920s. The thesis is developed through a discussion of first 
industrial and then class relations. 
 
 
Industrial relations 
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The ports that processed the vast majority of the UK’s imports and exports – petroleum 
aside – in the mid-1960s had been established in their importance by the 1910s: 
London, Hull, Leith, Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol and Southampton.16 
Employment in these ports from the 1940s to the 1960s was shaped by Bevin’s wartime 
dock labour reforms, consolidated by the National Dock Labour Scheme of 1947. Bevin 
was in 1922 the founding General Secretary of the TGWU, the main union representing 
dock labour, and Minister of Labour in Churchill’s wartime coalition, and his policies and 
the Dock Labour Scheme can be presented as major historical discontinuities.17 The 
Scheme was administered jointly by representatives of employers and labour; it provided 
the workforce – largely casual and without a regular employer, employment and income 
– with guaranteed weekly income, irrespective of time worked, so long as daily 
attendance at the docks was established.18 These reforms are consistent with 
McKibbin’s ‘redistribution of esteem’ argument and older ideas about war leading to 
significant social change. But the Dock Labour Scheme and industrial relations more 
generally in the ports in the 1950s and 1960s had decisive origins in a sequence of 
developments in the early 1920s. These included: the 1920 Shaw inquiry on dock 
labour; the formation of an employers’ organization, the National Council of Port Labour 
Employers, in 1920; the consolidation of labour representation with the foundation of the 
TGWU in 1922; and the innovation of collective bargaining in 1920 with the 
establishment, recommended by Shaw, of the National Joint Council for Dock Labour, 
renamed the National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry in 1944.19 At the 
Shaw inquiry Bevin argued for national wage bargaining, combined with industry-wide 
registration and financial maintenance of labour to replace the patchy existing 
arrangements for recruitment and remuneration.20 The National Joint Council (NJC) 
provided industry-wide wage negotiations, but ‘decasualization’ did not follow and so 
remained, for Bevin and the TGWU, unfinished business in the 1940s. 
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Yet the 1947 Scheme had a limited impact on the ports precisely because of the 
earlier establishment of national bargaining. This was hard won, and the TGWU and 
other port unions were required in the 1920s to concede ground, with employers 
responding to economic recession by successfully pressing for successive wage 
reductions. Shaw’s award of a minimum daily 16s was incrementally reduced to 10s by 
June 1923.21 These pay disputes inter-sected with numerous localized labour traditions 
that the TGWU was unable to overcome fully, and which consequently strengthened the 
union’s attachment in the 1950s and 1960s to the established institutions of national 
bargaining despite the introduction of the Scheme. In 1922 Bristol men felt they would 
fair better ‘on their own’, negotiating directly with local employers without national 
parameters; the 1923 agreement provoked a major unofficial stoppage in London that 
fractured the TGWU, with several thousand dockers establishing a dockers’ section of 
the Stevedores’ League, which had resisted the TGWU’s overture in 1922; the 
reconstituted rival, the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers, would dog the 
TGWU in the 1940s and 1950s.22 In Scotland the TGWU established itself on the east 
coast in 1922 but struggled to incorporate the Glasgow men, who established the 
Scottish Transport & General Workers’ Union (STGWU) in 1932.23 The STGWU failed to 
organize beyond the Clyde, with at least one recruitment drive stymied at Grangemouth, 
but it periodically badgered the TGWU, focusing on the big union’s modest successes in 
restoring wage cuts that were conceded in the 1920s and again in the early 1930s.24
A sequence of unofficial strikes followed in the ports from the 1940s to the 1960s. 
This was part of a wider industrial phenomenon, shaped by the shift from unemployment 
or under-employment to full employment, and the less tangible but important erosion of 
social deference after 1945. At the Rootes car plant in Linwood a sequence of 
stoppages culminated in the dismissal of 270 men in May 1964. These workers were 
unconcerned, telling journalists that ‘they felt they would get other goods jobs fairly 
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easily’.25 The sack – or threat of the sack – was not the disciplinary instrument that it had 
been in the 1920s and 1930s.26 Meanwhile, according to Geoffrey Goodman, unofficial 
forms of protest were encouraged by the loosening grip of the ‘Establishment’, in all 
branches of economic, social and political life, including the trade unions.27 This was 
recognised by the Donovan Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Organisations, which reported in 1968 that ‘full’ employment had encouraged the 
development of informal bargaining, between shop stewards and workplace managers, 
alongside formal bargaining, between union officials and employers’ representatives. In 
many sectors – including the docks –union officials consequently exercised a 
diminishing degree of control over industrial developments.28
Yet the post-1945 strikes, in the docks and elsewhere, drew very powerfully upon 
the inter-war past. This inculcated a sense among workers as well as employers that 
they should seek or expect adjustments in cash wages more or less immediately in line 
with changing market conditions. In the ports the unofficial strikes, along with a large-
scale stoppage by STGWU members in Glasgow in 1947, and a major inter-union 
dispute between the TGWU and the NASD in the mid-1950s,29 further strengthened the 
TGWU’s determination to defend the integrity of national bargaining, and the institution 
that encompassed this from the early 1920s, the NJC. The National Dock Labour Board 
(NDLB), responsible for administering the Scheme from 1947, was duly given little room 
to ‘grow’. In 1965 Lord Devlin, a High Court judge who conducted several investigations 
into dock labour, noted Bevin’s original conception that the NDLB should supersede the 
NJC, taking responsibility for working conditions and wages. Yet it suited the TGWU – 
and the employers, who disliked the Scheme because they resented sharing 
responsibility for managerial functions with labour – to retain the NJC and limit the NDLB 
to managing the size of the registered workforce and maintaining discipline.30
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The continued primacy in the ports of the NJC, which settled wages in the 1950s 
as in the 1920s chiefly in accordance with short-term market and trading conditions and 
with limited reference to longer-term social and industrial imperatives, reflected the 
survival of voluntarist industrial relations more generally in the post-1945 economy. 
There had been the potential for the transformation of industrial relations towards the 
end of the First World War, when reconstruction debates briefly realized the idea of 
Whitley Councils, to provide joint consultation not just on wages and conditions but the 
wider ‘welfare’ of the workforce. But these had assumed little material substance, 
marginalized especially by the difficult economic conditions of the 1920s that hardened 
the attitudes of employers and impelled union negotiators like Bevin to focus on the 
narrower fronts of wages and hours.31 For the next four or five decades these basic 
material concerns formed the core of industrial negotiations. As Alan Fox put it, 
employers generally accepted the involvement of unions in ‘market relations’, the ‘terms 
and conditions on which labour is hired’, while resisting their involvement in ‘managerial 
relations’, ‘what management seeks to do with its labour having hired it’. In the tight 
labour markets of the 1950s and 1960s there was some informal labour control of 
‘managerial relations’ in some sectors,32 including the ports. But union leaders, 
employers’ representatives and policy makers paid no concerted attention to industrial 
democracy until the 1970s, when stimulated to do so by deindustrialization, company 
failures and shop floor ‘work-ins’. The Labour government responded by encouraging a 
number of workers’ co-operatives and in 1976 established an inquiry on industrial 
democracy, chaired by Alan Bullock.33 Qualitative change duly arrived in industrial 
relations, although this was driven from the right rather than the left, with industrial 
pluralism and labour participation in management buried by the crude ‘management’s 
right to manage’ unitarism of the 1980s and the softer but essentially unitarist Human 
Resource Management focus of the 1990s.34
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 In the public sector established by the 1945 Labour government industrial 
relations were not appreciably ‘better’ or different from the private sector. On the 
railways the position generally was peaceful, although there was a national strike in 
1955, a threatened national strike in 1958 and an expensive settlement of a national pay 
dispute for Harold Wilson’s Labour government in 1966.35 In the coalfields 
nationalization had an even more limited impact on industrial relations, despite the 
workforce’s support for a measure that offered employment protection in a sector where 
demand was falling and surplus labour capacity seemed to be evident.36 In the 1950s 
unofficial strikes occurred frequently in mining, generally arising from piece-rate 
disputes, and at the end of the 1960s, amid the pit closures that reduced employment in 
the industry from 517,000 in 1963-4 to 281,500 in 1971-2, there were two major 
unofficial stoppages that prefigured the national strikes of 1972 and 1973-4.37 These 
disputes, and the further ‘sequel’, the 1984-5 strike, had roots in the 1921 and 1926 lock-
outs, and were characterized by powerful regional labour identities and structures that 
the National Union of Mineworkers inherited in 1944 from its predecessor, the Mining 
Federation of Great Britain.38  
This long weight of history in industrial bargaining in the 1960s and 1970s was 
familiar to Hugh Clegg, Professor of Industrial Relations at Oxford, and Jack Scamp, a 
personnel manager at G. E. C with a public reputation for industrial ‘trouble-shooting’, 
especially in the motor industry,39 who assisted the Devlin port inquiries. But both men 
were shaken by other continuities that they witnessed in the ports in February 1965. 
They were ‘appalled’ especially by the welfare amenities, lamenting the employers’ 
refusal to provide adequate toilets, washrooms, drinking water or rest and shelter areas. 
Improvements in all main ports had been recommended by the NDLB in 1949 but were 
still to be implemented, despite recurrent complaints by the TGWU to employers on the 
NJC.40 In 1966 the Management Consultants Association, surveying London amenities 
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for the NDLB, estimated that £2 million worth of work was required on shelter 
accommodation, canteens, toilets and washing facilities. The consultants emphasized 
the economic and managerial benefits involved. Dedicated shelters would eliminate the 
practice of seeking protection during rain breaks in goods sheds, and hence reduce 
‘pilferage’; a larger number of small, localized shelters, close to the work, would replace 
existing ‘large, amorphous ones which are considered to encourage time-wasting 
practices’ and so enhance ‘managerial control of the labour force’.41
 The physical environment of the docks in the 1960s was unchanged in other 
ways since the 1920s or 1930s. A major inquiry into port transport in 1962, appointed by 
Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government and chaired by Lord Rochdale, the cotton 
magnate, recorded that technical innovations had been made since the 1940s, with fork 
lift trucks and slightly larger cranes and hoists. But there had been no generalized shift 
to mechanization, and work remained highly labour intensive.42 This partly suited the 
dockers, for the manual handling of multifarious cargoes and vessels involved 
substantial knowledge, even skill. This enhanced their position in the tight post-1945 
labour market and provided them with considerable autonomy in their work.43 But the 
work was consequently dangerous. While Rochdale reported a slight decrease in 
fatalities from 52 in 1950 to 38 in 1960, the number of non-fatal recorded accidents 
increased from 5,970 to 7,130.44 In 1966 the Management Consultants’ Association 
reported falling accident rates, attributed to improved packaging and ship design, 
together with incrementally enhanced mechanization. Yet ‘safety consciousness’ in the 
ports was still ‘well below the level generally achieved in manufacturing industry’.45
 Dockers traded risks against rewards. Dennis Anderson, a Liverpool docker, told 
Fred Lindop that strikes took place when men – unequipped with special clothing until 
the late 1960s – refused to handle cargoes perceived as ‘a hindrance to our health’.46 
Yet ‘health and safety’ strikes were rarely waged in absolutist terms: subject to bonus 
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payments ‘dangerous’ work was undertaken. The best-known strike of this kind, in June 
1948, followed the suspension from work of eleven Londoners who refused to handle a 
cargo of zinc oxide that they regarded as hazardous. But for additional cash – 5s per ton 
instead of the 3s 4d agreed by their employer and union official – the men would have 
completed the job.47 A negotiated approach to health and safety was apparent in other 
overwhelmingly masculine occupations, notably shipbuilding, coalmining and 
construction. This suggests to Arthur McIvor and Ronnie Johnston a strong relationship 
between gender consciousness and health and safety: ‘real’ men complained about 
dangers with reluctance and the hazards of heavy, manual work enhanced the prestige 
of its practitioners.48 So it was in the docks, where one of the most prominent labour 
activists, London’s Jack Dash, habitually worked naked to the waist, earning the nick-
name ‘Nature Boy’, and made light of a potentially fatal 50 feet fall into a ship’s hold in 
December 1960.49
The most striking continuity of all in the ports, meanwhile, was the casual 
employment of registered men, with permanent engagement established only in 
September 1967.50 In most ports by 1939 unions had secured arrangements where only 
registered labour could be utilized,51 but the short-term employment of these men before 
1947 was characterized by numerous petty inconveniences and humiliations. 
Arrangements for demonstrating unemployment in the docks were rigidly applied, 
requiring that dockers report twice each day to the port office. In 1925 the TGWU 
proposed that less fruitless time be spent travelling to the docks by having men make 
the second daily report at their nearest employment exchange. Having met Bevin and 
other TGWU officers, the Minister of Labour, Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, rejected this, a 
measure, perhaps, of his Ministry’s unimaginative approach to unemployment relief in 
the 1920s.52 For those anticipating work there were strict rules to be observed. TGWU 
members in 1936 at Dundee’s Camperdown Dock reported before 7.45 am each 
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morning and 12.45 pm each afternoon, although they were not paid until work started at 
8 am and 1 pm. Moreover, ‘Members seeking employment must stand at a reasonable 
distance from foremen while booking on. No hustling allowed, and members when 
employed to separate from those looking for work.’53 The Scheme did not disturb these 
inconveniences substantially. Men still mustered at the call stands each morning and 
afternoon, even when no work was anticipated. Most dockers laboured without a regular 
employer and were hired for single jobs that could run for a single morning or afternoon 
only. Piece-rates, the norm in all main ports other than Liverpool, reflected the cargo’s 
market value as well as the effort involved in shifting it, giving a competitive and 
sometimes corrupt edge – with foremen inviting bribes – to the twice-daily ‘call-ons’ at 
the dock gates.54 Those not engaged enjoyed the Scheme’s basic protection, but there 
were intermittent echoes of inter-war joblessness and insecurity. In 1961-2 the NDLB 
reported that the recession had inflated unemployment among dockers to 11.35 per 
cent.55 More men were duly passing idle mornings near the poorly appointed docks, 
spending rather than earning, and – perhaps – nursing their various grievances. A 
reporter for The Times noted that those ‘kicking their heels in dockside cafés’ were 
‘saying what they like about the Chancellor, the employers, the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union and the Dock Labour Scheme’. Travel and subsistence alone absorbed 
such a proportion of the basic weekly guarantee (£7-8s) that significant financial 
hardship – which the Scheme was designed to uproot – was returning to the docks.56
These intersecting problems – casual recruitment, under-employment, the 
expenses of idle time – were aggravated in larger urban centres, where post-1945 re-
housing programmes dispersed men further from the ports, adding to travel costs and 
the frustration of attendance without employment. The Management Consultants’ 
Association calculated that in December 1965 some 73.3 per cent of the London men 
travelled less than 5 miles to work; 18 per cent travelled between 5 and 10 miles and a 
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significant minority, 8.7 per cent, more than 10 miles.57 One of these longer-distance 
commuters was Reuben Harley, who journeyed from Hawkwell in Essex to the West 
India Dock in Poplar, a round trip of 50 miles. Harley wrote to Lord Devlin in April 1966, 
outlining the position for those reliant on the basic weekly wage, now £11-1s-8d. Having 
covered rent and rates (£3-19s), rail and bus fares (£3) and dinners and other 
consumables (£1), Harley had just £3-2s-8d to meet insurance, food, clothes, holidays 
and union subscriptions. He observed with some pungency that while his basic earnings 
had risen by 233 per cent since 1939, the cost of living – measured in the cash values of 
his weekly expenses – had risen by 600 per cent.58
 
 
Social Relations 
 
These various continuities – adversarial bargaining, labour intensity, casual recruitment 
and poor amenities – undoubtedly reinforced the strength of class feeling in the ports 
where, according to Ted Johns, a retired London docker, ‘all employers are bastards’.59 
The high profile of unofficial and strongly class-conscious workplace representatives like 
Jack Dash indicates a very thick wedge of militant opinion in the docks. But social 
relations in the ports, as in other economic sectors, were not homogeneous, and London 
members of the TGWU Docks Group National Committee articulated a competing strand 
of opinion when they complained in 1961 and 1967 that unofficial strikes ‘black-legged’ 
the union and ‘received such adverse publicity that the whole country was becoming 
heartily sick of the word "dockers"’.60 The London officials were, of course, keen to 
protect the integrity of joint industrial bargaining, which was itself an ambiguous measure 
of social relations in the ports as elsewhere in the economy. This system arguably 
institutionalized the competing social interests of capital and labour, by highlighting the 
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existence of ‘two sides’ in industry. This, according to Alan Fox, worried business 
leaders, including the CBI President in 1966, Sir Maurice Laing, who talked instead of 
‘partners’ engaged in joint enterprise. Yet through negotiation and compromise, joint 
industrial bargaining, as Fox also noted, with its ‘pluralist’ overtones, provided the means 
of at least mitigating class differences.61  
Heterogeneous class relationships in the ports might also be inferred from the 
activities of the various sports and welfare clubs that were overseen by the NDLB. By 
1960 there were 24 dockers’ clubs around the ports, sometimes established in fairly 
handsome premises with NDLB loans and maintained through weekly members’ 
subscriptions. The Dundee club, for instance, was housed in an imposing Victorian 
mansion overlooking the port area, one mile away, from a vertical height of 100 metres. 
The NDLB disbursed additional funds, from employers’ levies, through its National 
Sports Committee, to which numerous local clubs were affiliated. In the largest ports of 
Liverpool and London some 30-40 per cent of registered workers belonged to sports 
clubs in the 1950s and 1960s. The social politics of these clubs were intriguing. The 
Liverpool men’s sports ground was opened in 1953 by the Duke of Edinburgh, who the 
workers presented with a silver-plated hook (the tool used by dockers to gain purchase 
on sacking and other forms of packaging).62 The London Port Workers’ Sports 
Federation was established in 1955, and at the end of 1965 had just under 10,000 
affiliates in eleven separate clubs, as indicated in Table 1. This represented a fair slice of 
the 25,484 registered dockers in the port in 1965.63
 
Table 1: London Portworkers’ Sports’ Federation, Membership, 1964-5 
Affiliated Club Allocated Weekly or Staff Total 
India & Millwall Docks Social Welfare 
Association 
886 88 974 
London Doclab Staff Club  138 138 
National Dock Labour Club  71 71 
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Poplar, Blackwell & District Rowing Club 70 15 85 
River Thames Social & Sports Club 1,964 699 2,663 
Royal Docks Sports Association 876 230 1,106 
Sec. 6 London Dockers Athletics & Social Club 847 116 963 
Surrey Docks Social Welfare Association 1,617 434 2,051 
Tilbury Dockers Social & Sports Club 997 12 1,099 
Two-Seven-Nine Welfare Association 557 125 682 
TOTAL   9,742 
Source: PRO, BK 18/8, Annual Report of the Council of Management, London 
Portworkers’ Sports Federation, 1964-5. 
 
Employers supported the Federation’s activities. G. E. ‘Bill’ Tonge and J. K. Badcock, 
chairman and secretary of the Port Employers in London, attended monthly meetings of 
the Federation’s Council of Management; G. E. Tonge trophies were contested within 
the Federation in both cricket and 6-aside football competitions.64 An annual golf match 
between the Federation and Port Employers in London was initiated in 1961 at Mid Kent 
Golf Club. This was drawn, 5 games each, the Federation recording its ‘appreciation that 
the Employers had defrayed cost of Green Fees and entertained all participants to lunch 
and tea’. Special thanks were paid to R. H. Hampson, of Scruttons, London’s largest 
private employer with roughly 3,000 men in 1960, and sponsor of a separate annual golf 
competition since 1957, where Federation members played for the Philip Scrutton Golf 
Trophy over 27 holes at Mid Kent. At the 1961 Federation-Employers match Hampson 
provided and presented prizes to participants; in subsequent years a ‘very handsome 
silver Challenge Cup’ was contested, gifted by Tonge on behalf of London employers.65 
The Federation won this in 1962, 7 games to 3, after which ‘both sides presented prizes 
and gifts and spend a most convivial hour together in the Bar Lounge’ at Mid Kent.66 The 
Federation enjoyed further victories before the ‘justifiably jubilant’ Employers team 
prevailed in a close finish in October 1966, winning the last three 2-balls to secure a 
margin of 7½ to 5½. One of these winners was J. Grigg of Scruttons.67
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This harmonious social inter-action in sporting contexts co-existed with ongoing 
tension in the workplace. The Port Employers in London, along with the National 
Association of Port Employers, which Tonge served in the 1950s and 1960s, strongly 
opposed the NDLB’s joint industrial management of discipline and the scale of the 
workforce. Jack Jones, TGWU General Secretary from 1969 to 1978, noted that Tonge’s 
genial style ‘concealed an iron fist’, and his opposition to labour in disputes on the NJC 
was unambiguously determined.68 As a corporate body employers had attempted to 
resist joint management in 1947, and recurrently sought the withdrawal of union 
representatives from responsibility for these matters in the 1950s and 1960s.69 The 
friendly golf matches and cricket or football trophies might appear at odds with this 
continuing struggle between labour and capital, but can actually be understood as a by-
product of industrial tension, which employers perhaps attempted to mediate – more or 
less consciously – through the sporting encounters. Tonge and Scrutton could deflect 
some criticism of the employers’ corporate reluctance to move beyond casual 
employment relations, and the miserable condition of workplace amenities, by pointing to 
the modest sums expended on sports and welfare clubs. 
 The employers’ broad disinclination to invest in capital equipment and welfare 
amenities was identified as a central characteristic of port transport in Lord Rochdale’s 
1962 report on the sector’s ‘inefficiencies’. This investigation stemmed from complaints 
by port users about delays, believed by Macmillan’s Chancellor, Selwyn Lloyd, and his 
Ministers of Transport and Labour, Ernest Marples and John Hare, to result mainly from 
strikes and ‘restrictive’ labour practices.70 Rochdale viewed matters differently, observing 
that ‘labour difficulties’ were merely a symptom of port transport’s problems, pointing to 
the wider context of casual employment, poor amenities and under-investment in capital 
equipment.71 But the inquiry enabled business users to bring complaints about labour 
into the public domain. The National Union of Manufacturers, the Federation of British 
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Industry, the National Association of British Manufacturers, the London Chamber of 
Commerce, which represented hundreds of port users, and the Road Haulage 
Association all offered explanations of alleged congestion and operational inefficiencies 
chiefly in terms of the behaviour of the workforce, the organization of the TGWU, or the 
joint-industrial structure of the Dock Labour Scheme. These business representatives 
ventured no direct criticism of port employers.72
In this respect the process – rather than the report – of the Rochdale 
investigation inter-sected with ideas about Britain’s economic decline, and contributed 
significantly to the ‘scapegoating’ of labour as a chief explanation for this decline in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. There is fairly broad agreement nowadays among academic 
historians that the extent of British ‘decline’ has been exaggerated. Alan Booth has 
indicated that manufacturing industry actually performed reasonably well in the post-
1945 period; Jim Tomlinson has argued that ‘decline’ was more of an ideological 
construct than an economic or industrial phenomenon; reviewing the economic and 
business history literature David Edgerton has noted the inclination of scholars to accept 
the ‘decline of declinism’.73 Edgerton and Tomlinson have also scrutinized the 
methodological and analytical weaknesses of Correlli Barnett, the arch-declinist, whose 
many books are plainly compromised by their inadequate grounding in historical context 
and literature, and tendency to present primary evidence inaccurately.74 Straw man 
though he may be, however, Barnett produces books that continue to enjoy wide 
circulation. The most recent volume of his post-1945 history emphasizes the importance 
of dock strikes, ‘spectacular mutinies’ that damaged manufacturing exports, held up 
imports, and occupied the precious time of ministers and civil servants. In less colourful 
prose Derek Aldcroft and Michael Oliver directly link collective bargaining, strikes and 
‘restrictive practices’ with ‘sub-optimal economic performance’, and position port 
transport – along with car production, coal, steel, shipbuilding and printing – as one of 
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the sectors where strikes were ‘endemic’, resulting in ‘more than a marginal influence in 
terms of lost production and progress’.75
Table 2 offers some perspective on the linkage between industrial relations and 
economic performance in the ports. It will be seen that in most years only a very modest 
volume of working time was lost to industrial disputes. The data undermines the basis for 
the position applied by Aldcroft and Oliver to the docks, with no strong correlation 
between increased levels of strike action and diminished productivity. From 1967 to 
1970 the trends in strikes and productivity were both rising, the consequence of 
‘decasualization’, driven by Harold Wilson’s Labour government and continued by 
Edward Heath’s Conservative government, with casual recruitment finally replaced by 
more permanent employment relationships. Designed to improve industrial relations, this 
necessitated a reduction in the volume of registered workers – and employers – and was 
supported by redundancy payments funded chiefly by central government.76
 
Table 2: Dry Traffic, Employment and Days Lost to Industrial Disputes in British 
ports operating under the National Dock Labour Scheme, 1960-1970 
 
Year Dry Traffic 
(exports and 
imports; 
tonnage in 
millions) 
Registered Dock 
Workers 
(average of 
monthly figures) 
Tonnage per 
worker per 
annum 
Days Lost 
to 
Industrial 
Disputes 
Days Lost 
to 
Industrial 
Disputes 
per 
Registered 
Worker 
1960 91.3 72,550 1,258 421,000 5.8 
1961 86.2 71,679 1,202 159,000 2.2 
1962 85.7 66,811 1,283 147,000 2.2 
1963 91.7 64,957 1,419 46,000 0.7 
1964 97.8 64,083 1,526 129,000 2 
1965 95.7 65,128 1,469 105,000 1.6 
1966 85 62,522 1,360 134,000 2.1 
1967 87.3 60,144 1,452 606,000 10 
1968 92.7 56,563 1,638 110,000 2 
1969 93.7 52,732 1,777 424,000 8 
1970 97.7 46,912 2,083 718,000 15.3 
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Sources: National Ports Council, Digest of Port Statistics, 1966, pp. 21, 30, and 1971, pp. 11, 25; 
Ministry of Labour Gazette, January 1962, p. 4, January 1963, p. 6, January 1965, p. 20, January 
1967, p. 11; Employment and Productivity Gazette, January 1969, p. 44; Department of 
Employment Gazette, January 1971, p. 63. Note that there were 60,144 registered workers for 
the first 37 weeks only of 1967; for the remainder of 1967 there were 57,505. 
 
The increase in productivity from 1967 might suggest that the ports were carrying excess 
labour beforehand. Yet employers themselves accepted, if sometimes reluctantly, that 
spare capacity was needed to meet upward traffic flows, and a reasonable alternative 
interpretation might be that the workforce performed creditably enough, given the limited 
investment in capital facilities. Bob Mellish, one-time London docker and the Labour 
Party’s Transport spokesman, expressed this view in a Parliamentary debate on 
Rochdale. ‘We make a great mistake’, he said, ‘if we let it go out from the House today 
that somehow the British docks industry is now badly run, that it is an industry almost 
dying of decay, that the whole industry is riddled with restrictive practices and that hardly 
anybody is doing any work.’ Mellish claimed a 12 per cent increase in productivity in the 
ports from 1951 to 1961, achieved on the basis of the workers’ efforts and their 
willingness to cooperate with a substantial degree of mechanisation.77
 Mellish was defending his ‘own’ people, but his partiality should not obscure the 
probability – projected in Table 2 – that industrial disputes had little bearing on economic 
performance in the ports. It would seem plausible to extend Tomlinson’s model of 
decline as a constructed process to encompass the ideological ‘scapegoating’ of labour: 
anti-labour forces mustered ‘declinist’ arguments, rooted in criticisms of organized 
workers, as strategic elements in the conduct of industrial politics. This was evident in 
other sectors, as Tim Claydon demonstrates in his analysis of press coverage of 
disputes in car manufacturing, with much editorial coverage of their alleged impact on 
production and sales and little on their under-lying industrial and social causes.78 In this 
connection it seems fitting that car manufacturers were among the sternest business 
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critics of port labour. In December 1964 the Society of Motor Manufacturers & Traders 
Ltd complained to Devlin that unofficial dock strikes were the main obstacle to the 
delivery for export of cars.79 This ignored deficiencies in car design, production and 
marketing. It also represented – like the evidence of port users to Rochdale – an 
exhibition of class solidarity among business leaders, endorsing the port employers’ 
position that ‘failure’ in the docks was chiefly the result of labour organization, practices 
and behaviour. In this respect Rochdale marked a quantitative rather than qualitative 
shift in the character of criticism of dockers. The Dock Labour Scheme’s introduction in 
1947 was accompanied by thoroughly ideological arguments – in the daily and business 
press – about the irredeemably idle and opportunistic nature of many dockers.80
 Dockers were in some respects an unusual group. In their labour process, 
traditions and organization they resembled, it is true, ‘traditional’ manufacturing workers, 
but they were also service workers. This second aspect of their identity explains the 
public criticism of their behaviour from the 1940s to the 1960s: a major dock strike was 
experienced directly by consumers as well as port users or policy makers and perceived 
to be a crisis in a way that a major strike in private sector manufacturing – cars included 
– was not. States of Emergency were declared and troops despatched to clear food 
imports by Attlee’s Labour government in 1948 and 1949; in May 1962, when a national 
dock strike was averted by eleventh hour talks at the Ministry of Labour, Macmillan had 
been prepared to do likewise to keep the ports open.81 Middle class, business and 
consumer complaints about dockers from the 1940s to the 1960s in this respect 
anticipated criticism of organized workers more broadly in the public sector in the 1970s, 
including those in transport, the medical services and the dustmen and gravediggers of 
the 1978-9 ‘Winter of Discontent’.82 Here there were clear echoes of McKibbin’s inter-
war class stereotypes, which amounted to the construction of an enlarged non-unionized 
‘public’ that was mobilized against the organized working class.83
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 So the ‘public’ criticism of the dockers from the 1940s to the 1960s arguably 
represents a bridge between the anti-labour sentiments of the 1920s and the 1970s, 
indicating the strength of continuities in social as well as industrial relations in Britain’s 
longer mid-twentieth century. Social relations in the 1940s and 1950s were certainly 
different from the 1920s and 1930s. How, otherwise, could a Labour government have 
been formed in 1945 with substantial middle class support, and how else could this 
government have redistributed economic and social resources in favour of the manual 
working class, symbolized by the establishment of the National Health Service? But the 
shifts in social relations should not be exaggerated. Historical accounts of the 1940s now 
increasingly emphasize the degree of middle class social and cultural opposition to the 
Labour government, partly driven by affluent consumerist objections to rationing and ‘fair 
shares’.84 In similar vein David Howell’s recent essay on the 1946 Laski libel trial is 
extremely instructive, showing that numerous English middle class prejudices and 
mechanisms were invoked, including a special jury of persons with rateable property of 
£100 rather than the normal £30, to defeat the contention by Harold Laski, Chairman of 
Labour’s National Executive Committee, that he was libelled during the 1945 General 
Election by, among others, Lord Beaverbrook’s Daily Express. There is a sense, in other 
words, that middle class antagonism towards manual workers and their organizations – 
trade unions and the Labour Party – was tempered or constrained, but certainly not 
uprooted, in the 1940s.85
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The evidence presented in this article has highlighted important continuities in Britain’s 
‘longer’ mid-twentieth century history, chiefly in industrial relations and social class 
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divisions, which outweigh the discontinuities of the 1940s and 1950s that were 
emphasized in literature from the 1960s until perhaps the mid-1990s. It reinforces the 
emerging view that social change was limited in the ‘narrow’ mid-century, and suggests 
that those changes that took effect were rooted essentially in institutional arrangements 
established in the 1920s. The post-1950 ‘golden age’ advances by manual workers in 
many branches of industry – including many ‘affluent’ workers in capital-intensive 
consumption industries as well as ‘traditional’ workers in labour-intensive productive 
industries – were located in what can now be seen as short-term changes in labour 
market conditions. Workers benefited from these conditions because of the industrial 
relations structures that were established before the Second World War. But the extent 
of these manual working class advances was constrained by the class relations inherited 
from the 1920s and 1930s. In the ports work was dominated by significant continuities: 
casual recruitment, adversarial industrial relations, poor amenities. These were more 
important than the central innovation of the period, the Dock Labour Scheme, which 
employers, in a clear illustration of the unchanging nature of social relations, opposed in 
the 1940s and sought to undermine in the 1950s and 1960s. Dockers – like other 
manual workers – encountered media, business and consumer hostility, especially 
during strikes. This criticism was disproportionately excessive, given the extremely 
modest impact of industrial action on economic performance, and qualifies Ross 
McKibbin’s suggestion that the 1940s and 1950s witnessed a quantitative redistribution 
of ‘social esteem’ as well as material resources in favour of manual workers.86
 This perspective, that material conditions in the ports were relatively unchanged 
in the 1940s and 1950s, adds to the growing body of historical literature that questions 
the existence of a broad-ranging consensus in Britain after the Second World War. 
Peregrine Worsthorne’s characterization of political, economic and social conditions as 
amounting not to a ‘consensus’ but to a ‘stalemate’ between working and middle classes 
 24
is certainly apt, at least so far as the ports are concerned. This stalemate was unlocked 
in the docks only by a conjunction of exogenous shocks in the early 1970s: the 
increased adoption of the technology of containerization of cargoes; the related shift 
from traditional ports to newer centres, notably Dover, Felixstowe and Harwich; and the 
impact on employment and industrial relations more generally of the 1973 oil crisis. 
These developments shifted the balance of forces in the ports very quickly away from 
the workers and in favour of the employers, underlining further the temporary nature of 
manual working class advances in the ‘narrow’ mid-twentieth century. 
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